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communication systems and to modify objects
~or use as tools, two activities once deemed
the exclusive property of human beings. Such
sophisticated behavior has led a number of
sciencists to conclude that at least some ani
mals have a fairly substantial mental life.'
Needless to say, this conclusion has marked
implications for the weighing of animal in
terests. An animal with a high level of
awareness is vulnerable in more ways than one
wich a low level and, consequently, places a
greater demand on our moral consideration.
Excitement over these discoveries, however,
should not lead us to forget the remaining,
significant differences between animal and
human behavior. Recently discovered similar
i:ies, significant though they be, are not
great enough to bridge that divide. Nor is
it likely that future research will do so.
Barring the discovery of presently unknown
life-forms, human uniqueness appears a fact
to be lived with. To those concerned about
animal welfare such a conclusion may seem un
:ortunate and even distressing. Tradition
ally, human uniqueness has been taken to
justify a rather cavalier attitude toward
animal welfare. Whether one spoke of souls,
minds, intrinsic value, or divine commands,
the well-being of animals was felt to be in
significant compared to that of human beings.
The result is well-known: the most trivial
of human interests allows the most thorough
disregard for animal interests. It is no
wonder, then, that advocates of animal wel
fare have preferred to emphasize similari
:1es while downplaying differences between
animal and human behavior.
In what follows, I want to re-examine the
role of human uniqueness in adjudicating con
flicts between animal and human interests.
~~ conclusion will be that for the most part
t~is role has been misunderstood.
Properly
understood, human uniqueness is a vital com
ponent in the case for animal welfare. My
argument ~ill proceed in two stages. To be
I will sketch a system of moral princi
ooin ,
.
ples for adjudicating conflicts between an~mal and human interests. Iftlile grancing some
Doral consideration to animal interests,
these principles both recognize human unique
ness and grant high priority to human inter
ests. Having outlined this system, I will
use it to address questions regarding the
morality of animal experimentation. After
distinguishing two distinct ways in which
[he systen can be applied to such questions,
I will argue that resolution of the debate
over animal experimentation depends to a
large extent on fundamental assumptions about

human nature. It is here that human unique
ness lends a hand to animal welfare.
I

What needs to be shown with respect to ani
mals is not only that their welfare i$ ~
matter of moral concern but equally important
how much weight animal interests ought to
carry whenever they conflict with human in
terests. One plausible approach to this
problem has been labeled by VanDeVeer "two
factor egalitarianism." a As its name sug
gests, two-factor egalitarianism focuses on
two factors: these are. extent of interest
and psychological complexity. Once these are
determined, various principles inform the
moral agent how much weight each deserves,
allowing in general that significance varies
directly with extent of interest and degree
of psychological compleXity. Such a system
has intuitive appeal. 9 By focusing on the
extent of interest involved two-factor egali
tarianism allows us to take into account rela
tive cost and benefit. Underlying each de
cision will be a cost-benefit analysis. At
the same time, two-factor egalitarianism as
cribes greater weight to the interests of our
own kind, a position many persons find morally
appealing. Moreover, it does so on the non
discriminatory, or, egalitarian grounds of
psychological complexity. All this is not to
sav there are no problems regarding the
ac~eptability of two-factor egalitarianism as
a guide to moral deliberation. 1Q For purposes
of this paper, however, I will ignore what
ever difficulties there may be and work with
in the framework provided by two-factor egal
itarianism. My intention is to sketch a some
what plausible system in terms of which the
role of human uniqueness can be evaluated,
not to argue that two-factor egalitarianism
provides an adequate context for resolving
conflicts between animal and human interests.
Let me begin with extent of interest.
A continuum of interests is not difficult
to envision. With respect to myself, I know
that some things count more for my well-being
than others . . The extent of this counting is,
of course, not a matter of my apprehension
alone; it is a reflection of the world and my
place therein. In many cases, I am aware of
and correctly apprehend the relative impor
tance of my interests. In other cases, I do
not. Unlike normal, adult humans, the knowl
edge animals have of their own L~terests will
be extremely vague or entirely intuitive. 11
On our part, the determination and weighing
of animal interests requires careful, pro
longed observation, with special care taken
to avoid anthropomorphic distortions. Recent

E8A 11/1
studies of wolves, chimpanzees and gorillas
indicate that such distortions can be avoided
and animal interests assessed from an objec
tive, scientific standpoint. 12
Interests, both human and animal, can be di
vided up in several ways. For purposes of
this paper, I want to distinguish between
three levels of importance, which I call
'basic,' 'serious' and 'peripheral. '13 Per
ipheral interests are goods the absence of
which results in some loss but whose presence
is not essential to well-being. In this
sense, satisfactions of peripheral interests
are luxuries, pleasures that could be done
without. Basic interests lie at the other
extreme of the continuum. A basic interest
is a good, the absence of which results
either in death or a life not worth living.
For purposes of convenience, let me refer to
a basic interest whose frustration results
in death as a Bl-interest. A basic interest
whose frustration results in a life not worth
living I will refer to as a B2-interest. An
example of a B2-interest is the absence of
intense, prolonged suffering. An example of
a Bi-interest is food, the consumption of
which is necessary for life.
Serious interests lie near the middle of
the continuum. IJhile counting heavily to
ward the quality of existence, they are not
so basic that their frustration results in
death or an intolerable life. w~at their
frustration results in is, quite simply, a
bad life. What makes a life good or bad
will vary from kind to kind, as well as from
individual to individual. For our purposes,
we can regard a life as bad if a significant
number of natural tendencies are frustrated.
A bad life is a life without fulfillment.
An example of a serious interest for wolves
is membership in a pack. A solitary wolf
lacks opportunity to satisfy its strong
social instincts. An example of a serious
interest for human beings (as well as many
animals) is being loved or appreciated by
others of their kind. While life may not
cease to be worth living without such ful
fillment, it is hard to imagine a truly
happy person whose life is empty of affec
tion.
Just as interests lie on a continuum with
respect to importance, so animals and humans
lie on a continuum with respect to psycho
logical complexity. At one end of this con
tinuum are beings barely sentient, having no
more than a primitive capacity to feel pain
or pleasure. Here, the organism's drive for
homeostasis has become externalized in a non
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reflective awareness. The value of such aware
ness, limited as it is~· is that it allows for
greater adaptability: a painful course will be
avoided, a pleasurable one pursued. In this
way bare awareness of pain and pleasure allows
an organism to unthinkingly anticipate the
future and react accordingly. One characteris
tic of non-reflective awareness is that pat
terns of response must be built into the organ
ism, a product of evolutionary selection.
At Some point on the continuum, bare aware
ness of pain and pleasure is filled out with a
capacity to learn from experience, resulting
in more flexible patterns of behavior. Closed
instincts, a matter of rigid, genetic program
ming, become supplemented and, in some cases,
supplanted by open instincts. Unlike closed
instincts, open instincts specify general
patterns of response, leaving details to be
filled in by individual and communal exper
ience. Internally, animals which can learn
from experience will have more highly develop
ed nervous systems. Externally, animals which
can learn from experience will tend to be
social anirnals. 14 There are good reasons for
this. Whether limited or prolonged, the
effect of communal life is to shield individ
ual animals from deficiencies in their own
experience and/or capacities: the community
as a whole provides an ongoing reservoir of
adaptive response. Utilization of this res
ervoir requires highly developed means of
communication. Accordingly, animals with a
capacity to learn will have significant
capacities for expression, whether in the
form of gesture, sound, posture, or facial
expression.
Associated with plasticity of behavior is
the haVing of a unified life. For animals
near the bottom of the continuum, life is no
more than a series of discrete experiences,
some good, other bad. With increasing psy
chological complexity it beComes necessary
that life be unified over time not only in a
biological but also in. a "biographical"
sense. Past, present and future are thereby
b()und together in a way previously unknown.
The past remains present in memory and ca
pacity while the future anticipates itself
in long and short term goals. One measure
of the extent to which life becomes an
animal's own in more than a numer~cal sense
is the development of indiVidual personal
ities. For our purposes,· we can think of
personality as "unified complexity." Not
only is the behavior of animals having a
life in the biographical sense complex, it
is also unified in a distinctive manner. is
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It is not hard to run the continuum on from
here. In human beings we see a much greater
capacity to learn, brought about by neurologi
cal and social changes. Closed instincts
have receded further while open instincts
have become even more open. Along with human
culture and language has come increased indi
viduality. Most important, humans have ac
quired the capacity to conceptualize their
lives as wholes and, subsequently, direct them
according to rational and moral norms. Here,
awareness becomes fully reflective. Although
recent studies indicate that some primates
other than man are self-conscious--at least
to the extent that they can identify them
selves in mirrors and pictures--there is good
reason to believe their conceptual abilities
quite limited and virtually no reason to re
gard them as moral agents. So far, human be
ings stand alone at their end of the continuum.
I will call animals which are barely sentient
"level-I beings." Such beings have no more
than a primitive capacity to feel pain and
pleasure. Animals which have a life in the
biogrpphical sense, I will refer to as "level
II beings." The increasing complexity of
these animals allows their lives to be unified
over time in ways not previously possible.
Humans and whatever other beings have the ca
pacity to direct the lives they have in accord
with rational and moral norms, 1 will refer to
as "level-III beings." Here, personality
reaches its fulfillment in agency, made poss
ible by the apprehension of external standards
for behavior. Combining these three levels of
psychological complexity with our four kinds
of interests, we can now demarcate twelve, dis
tinct categories of interests. These are
listed in the follOWing table:

One way to proceed at this point would be
to raise a general question regarding guide
lines for moral judgment. Granted that we
need "ranking principles," how are we to
decide what is and what is not an acceptable
principle? While this is an important issue
which must eventually be ~aced, I am going to
sidestep it for purposes of this paper. Rather
than raising a general question about the
nature of morality, I will present six prin
ciples for adjudicating conflicts between
animal and human interests. Which, if any,
of these principles are morally justifiable
I will leave, in this paper, to the reader's
judgment. My purpose in presenting these
six principles is to outline a mininal, non
speciesistic system with respect to animal
welfare. In order to distinguish this sys
tem from other systems falling under the
rubric of two-factor egalitarianism I will
call it "the c-system." The c-system is a
minimal system with respect to animal wel
fare because in every kind of conflict save
one priority is granted to the interests of
higher beings. The c-system is non-species
istic in that it does not grant special sta
tus to humans simply on the grounds that
they are human. The source of human pri
ority lies in human capacity. An animal
belonging to level-III would deserve greater
consideration than a human belonging to
level-II. It is in this sense that the c
system is an egalitarian system.
The first three principles are common to
all systems falling under the rubric of two
factor egalitarianism. These are the left
right, the top-bottom and the cross-over
principle. The left-right principle concerns

cacegories of interest
Bl-interests
level-III beings
level-II beings
level-I beings

S-interests

P-interests

III S

III P

II S

II P

I S

I P

Each interest involved in a conflict can be
placed, more-or-less determinately, in one of
these categories. What are needed now are
principles ranking these categories with re
spect to moral significance.

interests in a particular row. that is, in
terests of the same level of beings. It
reads.
leaving aside the difference between
Bl and BZ interests and staying with

in a given row, interests trump, i.e.,
take moral precedence, from left to
right.
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(In a moment, we will consider 'the relative
weight of BI and Bz interests.) The top
bottom principle concerns interests in a
given column, that is, similar interests
held by beings of different levels. It
reads,
within each column interests trump
from top to bottom. l 6
The cross-over principle is needed for com
pleteness. It reads,
trumps are transitive.
Together the left-right, top-bottom and
cross-over principles resolve numerous con
flicts. Apart from the difference between
BI and B2 interests, they handle e~ery con
flict going down and/or to the rignt on our
table of interests. The remaining three prin
ciples deal with cases "cutting against the
"rain' " that is , where the lesser interests of
0
higher beings trump the greater interests of
lower beings, or conversely, the greater in
terests of lower beings trump the lesser in
terests of higher beings. These three prin
ciples are the BI ' SB and B2 principles. The
BI principle reads,
a P interest of a level-III being trumps
a BI interest of a level-lor level-II
being.
This controversial principle tells uS that
(normal) humans are justified in killing (nor
mal) animals for the sake of any interest
whatever. 17
The last two principles concern the extent
to which animals ought to suffer for the sake
of human interests. In stating them as well
as the BI principle, I am proceeding on the
assumntion that animals have a stronger in
terest in avoiding extreme suffering than in
staying alive. IS According to the SB prin
ciple,
the S interests of level-III beings trump
the B2 interests of level-I and level-II
beings while the P interests of level-III
beings trump the 5 interests of level-I
and level-II beings.
The SB principle allows you to inflict any
amount of suffering on an animal for the sake
of human fulfillment. It also allows you to
sacrifice the wellbeing of an animal for the
sake of any interest whatever.
The only principle contained in the c-sys
tem which rules in favor of animal interest
is the B2 principle. The B2 principle reads,
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t:he B., interests of level-I and level
II befngs trump the P interests of
level-III beings.
According to the BZ principle, it is wrong to
make the life of any animal unbearably hor
rible, that is, so bad that the animal is
better off dead, for the sake of peripheral
interests. To reject this principle would in
effect be to disregard animal interests all
together.
II

Together the left-right, top-bottom, cross
over, BI, SB and B2 principles define the c
svstem. As noted, the c-system is a minimal
system with respect to animal welfare. Given
the nature of this system it might well be
expected to justify in a rather straight for
wat'd manner present practices involving ani
mal suffering. What I hope to show in the
following is that this is an illusion. Even
a system granting minimal standing to ani
mals may impose forceful restrictions on
the way in which and the extent to which
animals can justifiably be made to suffer
or die. In order to show this I want to
concentrate not on highly questionable
practices, such as the use of rabbits for
cosmetic testing or the raising of veal
calves in small, wooden crates, but rather
on a practice which most people feel is
justified even if unfortunate, namely, the
use of animals in scientific experimenta
tion. What I want to argue is that even
on the c-system there are serious questions
about the justifiability of this practice.
1.et me begin by narrowing down my focus
of interest. A striking characteristic of
the use of animals in science is its great
diversity. One problem with the old debate
between "vivisectors and antivivisection
ists" is that it radically oversimplifies
the issues involved. Animals are used in
many different ways in science; they are
not just "cut up." Accordingly, the extent
to which animal interests are sacrificed
varies widely. On the one hand, field
studies such as those of Goodall and
Schaller need not involve any serious dis
ruption of animal interests. On the other
hand, studies such as the well-known depri
vation experiments of Harry Harlow and
colleagues involve an extreme sacrifice of
animal interest. Most situations involving
the use of animals in science lie somewhere
between these two extremes. In this paper
my concern is with those cases where sign1
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ficant suffering is inflicted on an animal.
That there are numerous cases ~here what we
have called B2 and S interests are sacri
ficed is clear. The person who doubts this
need only refer to the relevant literature.
19 Simply calling attention to these in
stances of significant suffering, of course,
is not to pass judgment on them either pro
or con. The question of justification is
one to which we now turn.
According to the c-system we are justi
fied in inflicting significant suffering
on an animal so long as that suffering is
necessary for the satisfaction of signi
ficant human interests. Such a view has at
present a wide constituency. Animal advo
cates work to eliminate instances of unnec
essary suffering. Scientists themselves
are trying increasingly hard to eradicate
instances of superfluous suffering, whether
these stem from poor experimental design,
sloppy technique or inadequate housing and
care. 20 Granted though that so many agree
that no more suffering should be inflicted
than necessary, why is it that scientists
and animal advocates often disagree about
what is and what is not necessary suffering?
This is especially puzzling in light of the
apparent fact that in cases such as that in
volving Jill and Philo almost everyone will
agree that the animal's interests ought to
be sacrificed. Of course, part of the reason
may be that some animal advocates are unin
formed sentimentalists or even that some
scientists allow egoistic desires for publi
cation and public esteem to interfere with
their moral judgment. Be this as it may, a
deeper source of disagreement lies in the use
by scientists and their critics of two radi
cally different ideals concerning how super
fluous suffering is to be detected. Unfor
tunately, the resulting difference in the way
cost-benefit analyses are derived is almost
invariably overlooked. What I want to do now
is to discuss this difference in approach. In
the process of so doing, I will suggest that
another source of disagreement is a differ
ence about what constitutes the most signifi
cant human interests.
The great humanitarian Albert Schweitzer
once posed the following as an ideal for
science:
Those who test operations or drugs on
animals, or who inoculate them with di
seases so that they may be able to help
human beings by means of the results
thus obtained, ought never to rest sat
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isfied with the general idea that their
dreadful doings are performed in pursuit
of a worthy aim. It is their duty to
ponder in every separate case whether
it is really and truly necessary thus to
sacrifice an animal for humanity.21
Put in our terms, Schweitzer is suggesting
that the scientist treat each sacrifice of
animal interest as analogous to the sacri
fice of Philo's interests. To do so, the
scientist must in each case compute animal
loss and human gain and:-then, weigh the
respective interests on some system such
as the c-system. The justified operations
will be those in which the gain outweighs
the loss. Let us refer to this ideal as
"the Schweitzerian ideaL" The Schweitzer
ian ideal requires a strict comparison of
interests frustrated and satisfied at an
individual level. This accords well with
our feeling that no animal should have to
suffer without good reason.
The Schweitzerian ideal embodies a strong
concern for animal welfare and it is not un
usual to hear scientists citing this ideal
with approval. However, scientists rarely
if ever shape and direct their own work
according to the dictates of the Schweitzer
ian ideal. By this I do not mean that
scientists cease to be concerned with animal
welfare when they actually engage in scien
tific inquiry, as though their apparent
acceptance of the Schweitzerian ideal were a
matter of hypocrisy. My point is simply that
in practice they operate, sometimes without
recognizing it, according to the dictates of
another ideal, an ideal I will refer to as
"the worthy practice ideal." By way of say
ing what this ideal is let me offer an ex
planation for the general neglect of the
Schweitzer ian ideal.
Application of the Schweitzerian ideal re
quires a "cost/benefit" analysis for each
particular case. It demands, in other ~ords,
that we perceive a direct relation between
interests frustrated and interests satisfied.
The problem is that in science as actually
practiced particular instances of animal suf
fering rarely coordinate directly with contri
butions to human welfare. In a recent study
of alternatives to animal experimentation,
the British scientist D. H. Smyth argues,
Attempts to base legislation on such
issues as whether the experiments are
directly useful in the alleviation of
suffering are not likely to be success
ful. It is impossible to make any dis
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tinction between fundamental, medical,
veterinary and commercial research
which could be useful in deciding which
particular piece of biomedical research
will contribute to the alleviation of
suffering. 22
Smyth's point is a telling ooe. The absence
of direct correlations between suffering and
payoff is not happenstance. Rather, it stems
from the very nature of science. Scientific
inquiry is not a linear process, laid out in
advance and checked by a few crucial experi
ments. While science is also not a matter of
trial and error, there. is a. marked element of
serendipity. Setting this factor of chance
in a social endeavor exceeding the grasp of
anyone person virtually entails that the im
pact of many experiments cannot be foreseen.
This, unfortunately, is as true for animal
experimentation as it is for atom-smashing.
The fact that in the former case we are deal
ing with sentient creatures is, as far as
scientific method is concerned, simply irrel
evant. None of this is to deny that good or
promising experimental design ca,n. be di.stin
guished from bad. These kinds of decisions
allow morally sensitive scientists tp week
out some animal work on the basis of low
promise. More often, individual cases elude
assessment on any moral system. The projected
payoff is too complexly related to the suffer
ing inflicted to be divided up or anticipated
in the manner required.
The worthy practice ideal affirms that sci
entists should inflict no more suffering than
is necessary for the pursuit of scientific
knowledge. Unlike the Schweitzerian ideal,
which focuses on individual cases, this ideal
focuses on the general practice of animal ex
perimentation. According to it, particular
instances of animal suffering are justified
if they occur as a consequence of responsible,
methodologically sound scientific practice.
If it is then asked why this connection jus
tifies animal suffering the answer is that
the general practice of science contributes
significantly to the alleviation of human
suffering. Instances of animal suffering
which result from improper methodology or
insignificant projects will not be justified
on the worthy practice idaa1.
Most scientists, I suggest, operate accord
ing to the worthy practice and not the
Schweitzerian ideal. One way to see this is
to consider the practical consequences of
each ideal. The worthy practice ideal allows
for an open-ended justification of animal ex
perimentation. It says: here is a worthy goa~
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pursue it. Whatever suffering occurs in the
pursuit of that goal is justified so long as
the reasonably anticipated benefits are
sufficiently great. Consequently, it is not
necessary to show in each individual case
that animal loss is balanced by human gain;
only that such loss as does occur occurs in
the practice of a responsible science. The
Schweitzerian ideal takes a very different
approach. To begin, it shifts the burden of
proof to the scientist with respect to each
individual
indiVidual case. It is not enough, in other
words, to show that animal suffering occurs
in the "pursuit of a worthy aim." "Every
separate case" must be weighed and whatever
suffering occurs shown to be compensated for
by a signif:cantly greater good. Assuming
that Smyth ~s correct in his claim that at
present such direct correlations cannot be
demonstrated for most instances of animal
research, it follows that the present use
of animals in science cannot be justified
on the Schweitzerian ideal. Acceptance of
that ideal would result in quite significant
restrictions being placed on the range and ex
tent of animal experimentation.
The worthy practice ideal has a strong
appeal, the basis of which lies in two con
victions: first, that science is in general
a worthy activity and, second, that scientific
progress can be maximized by minimizing
minimiZing non
methodological restrictions on scientific
work. The worthy practice ideal is attractive
because it gives scientists a great deal of
freedom to pursue as they see best what we
all see as worthy goals. Anyone who wants to
reject this ideal in favor of the Schweitzer
ian ideal will need to show either that ani
mals deserve more consideration than the
worthy practice ideal allows and/or that the
benefits derived from a science operating
under the worthy practice ideal are not that
much greater and perhaps even less than those
derived from a science operating under the
more restrictive Schweitzerian ideal. Let me
say a few words about how each line of argu
ment may be pursued.
Advocates of the Schweitzerian ideal will
want to argue that in the case of animal ex
perimentation we ought to sacrifice m~thod
ology for morality, that is, that we ought
t~ place non-methodological, moral restric
t~ons on what scientists do to animals even
when we accept as worthy, practices which
might be pursued more effectively without
such restrictions. Success in this regard
depends upon shOWing that our moral obliga
tions to animals are stronger than normally
perceived. If these obligations are strong
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enough, questions about animal experimenta
tion will parallel those about human experi
mentation. There is no doubt that we could
pursue some worthy goals more effectively
than we do if we gave free rein to the prac
tice of human experimentation. For instance,
our understanding of brain disorders could
be advanced greatly by studying the devel
opment of children on which we have inflicted
various kinds of cerebral lesions. Yet,
despite the worthiness of this end, we do
not engage in such a practice because we
quite properly regard it as morally repugnant.
The animal advocate who pursues this line
will argue, as many have, that the same con
siderations which prevent uS from giving
free rein to the practice of human experi
mentation ought to prevent us from giving
free rein to the practice of animal experi
mentation. 23
Arguments such as the above are extremely
important. We cannot get a grip on the moral
issues without them. One problem with such
arguments, though, is that taken by themselves
they may give the impression that the debate
over animal welfare is entirely a matter of
weighing animal interests against human inter
ests. This is a mistake. A large component of
the debate concerns determining what is in our
own best interests. If the extensive sacrifice
of animal interests is not in our own interes~
it will not be justified even on the c-system.
Acceptance of the worthy practice ideal as a
justified norm depends upon the presupposition
that the general practice of animal experimen
tation is a worthy practice. Although this pre
supposition is often accepted without pause,
it strikes me as highly questionable.
In a
moment, I will suggest several reasons for be
lieving that the general practice of animal
experimentation is not a worthy practice what
ever weight we assign animal interests. Prior
to doing this, however, let me set the stage
by pointing out three crucial differences be
tween the individual act and the general prac
tice of sacrificing animal interests.
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of Philo and Jill, wouldn't you feel morally
obligated to sacrifice Philo's interests? My
answer is, "Yes, I would." The act sacrificing
Philo's interests for the sake of Jill's is
morally justified. It does not follow from
this, however, that the general practice of
sacrificing animal interests is justified. As
I will now point out, there are important
differences between the individual act and
the general practice.
Consider for a moment, a difference with
respect to necessity. In the case of Jill
and Philo the father is forced to make a
difficult decision by extraordinary circum
stances; unless he acts his daughter will
very likely die. In addition to a clearly
perceived and quite specific connection be
tween Philo's (possible) loss and Jill's
(possible) gain, there is an element of real
necessity. The situation is quite different
with respect to the general practice of
animal experimentation. Here, there is no
parallel to the necessity confronting the
father. While there is no question that some
persons will suffer more and die sooner if
the general practice is terminated, society
itself would not be placed in any danger.
There is at present no overwhelming threat
to the existence or well-being of society
the staving off of which depends upon the
general practice of animal experimentation.
Instead of being forced upon us by an un
pleasant necessity, animal experimentation is
pursued as an apparent means to a better life.

There are other, equally important differ
ences between the individual case and the gen
eral practice. One concerns the link between
suffering and payoff. There is a good chance
that much suffering incurred in the general
course of research will never result in the
alleviation of either human or animal suffer
ing. Unlike those individual cases where
there is a direct connection between suffer
ing and payoff, benefits derived from scien
tific research follow a circuitous route. In
some cases, knowledge gained may never "pay
Unlike the Schweitzerian ideal, which assesses off" due to a lack of technology or will. On
individual sacrifices of animal interests one
the darker side, there is every reason to be
by one, the worthy practice ideal assesses in
lieve knowledge gained has and will be used
dividual sacrifices as components of a general
by some humans to violate the basic and ser
practice. Ultimately, it is the general prac
ious interests of other humans; governments
tice which must be justified on the worthy
are not loving fathers.
practice ideal. In attempting to so justify
Another difference has to do with the ex
a general practice it is crucial that we avoid
tent of animal suffering. Unlike the Jill/
a common confusion. Attempts to justify the
Philo case, there is no limit to the extent
general practice of animal experimentation
of
animal suffering which may be brought
often incorporate an emotional appeal to our
about
by the general practice of animal ex
intuitions about particular cases: if you
perimentation.
In the latter case, as opposed
were forced to choose between the interests
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to the former, we have an ,open-ended or "blank
check" justification. Given that we are un
likely to resolve all medical problems con
fronting us, there will always be more method
ologically sound experiments which may result
in beneficial knowledge. By linking the prac
tice of animal experimentation to such vaguely
apprehended promises rather than directly per
ceived necessities, an open-ended justifica
tion is provided for the sacrifice not of one,
tWO, or even hundreds but quite literally for
that of many billions.
The general practice of animal experimenta
tion involves much more than and cannot be
justified in the same terms as the sacrifice
of Philo's interests for Jill's. Crucial
differences with respect to necessity, payoff,
and extent of suffering drive a wedge between
our intuitions regarding particular cases and
our judgment about general practices. In the
latter case we must ask not only whether ani
mal interests should ever be sacrificed for
human interests--that is clear--but also whe
ther benefits derived from the general
practice outweigh losses resulting therefrom.
In raising this question I want to put aside
consideration of the extensive losses animals
suffer. Let us assume that animal interests
count for very little and ask, given this
assumption, whether the general practice of
methodologically-unrestricted animal experi
mentation is in the best interests of human
society.
In a paper describing some of the benefits
derived from animal experimentation, Orland
Soave concludes,
Animal research constitutes one of
the primary reasons for the high stand
ard of living and health enjoyed today
by citizens of the United States. 24
If correct, Soave's claim provides strong
support for the belief that animal experimen
tation is a worthy practice. It is, of course,
undeniable that the practice of animal experi
mentation has resulted in a number of contri
butions to human (and animal) welfare. Insulin,
open-heart surgery, the control of infection,
the development of powerful anesthetics and
other wonder-drugs are only some of the bene
fits derived from or in conjunction with ani
mal experimentation. These and other contri
butions, striking as they are, have led many
persons and especially scientists to conclude
with Soave that human society has a great
stake in animal experimentation. Despite its
surface appeal, such a claim is mistaken. Not
only is it not the case that present standards
of living and health are dependent on the gen-

eral practice of animal experimentation, it is
also the case that that practice for various
reasons decreases the value of life in any
society wherein it occurs.
By way of assessing Soave's claim we must
once again avoid confusing the particular and
the general. It does not follow from the
fact that particular individuals have profited
from animal research that society as a whole
has profited from such work. While it is clear
that some individuals have profited greatly
from the practice of animal experimentation,
there is good reason to believe that present
standards of living and health are not a con
seqUiance of nor dependent upon that practice.
The major contributions~f animal experimenta
tion to health lie in the area of recovery
from illness. The major determinates of
health, however, lie in the area of prevention.
A thorough study of documentary evidence re
garding causes of death in England and Wales
during the past three centuries led Thomas
McKeown to the fol~owing conclusion,
The appraisal of influences on health
in the past three centuries suggested
that we owe the improvement, not to
what happens when we are ill, but to
the fact that we do not so often be
come ill; and we remain well, not be
cause of specific measures such as
vaccination and immunization, but be
cause we enjoy a higher standard of
nutrition and live in a healthier
ellvironmentt . 2 5
ellvironmen
McKeown reaches the follOWing conclusion re
garding the contribution of medical research
to improved health,
The direction of medical research has
been determined by the belief thac im
provement in health depends essentially
on knowledge of the body and its diseases,
applied mainly through personal medical
intervention in the form of immunization
and therapy ... (T)his interpretation is
not in accord with past experience: the
modern improvement in health wa's initiated
and carried quite a long way with little
assistance from science and technology ....
26

Is MeKeown right? This is a difficult and im
portant question into which we can go no fur
ther here. 27 McKeown's research is of such a
quality as to indicate that claims about the
indispensability of animal research to public
health are highly suspect. 28 While McKeown
himself favors increased medical research, he
observes that "in advanced countries health
is still determined mainly by personal be
havior and the environment.,,29
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If animal research does not make an impor
tant and indispensable contribution to public
health, questions must also be raised about
its economic feasibility. Animal research
is expensive and as such places strain on an
already overstrained national budget. 30 Per
haps money used in support of animal research
could be better used elsewhere. Rather than
pursue this line of criticism, however, I want
to turn the discussion in another direction.
I have suggested that the general practice of
animal experimentation does not make a signi
ficant contribution to public health. I want
now to argue that in various ways that prac
tice undermines the value of life in modern
society. The charges I will make are contro
versial not least because they have to do with
·.rh.at might be called "intangible factors."
How one views them will depend in large measure
on how one views human life. At bottom they
have to do with questions about what consti
tutes a truly "good life"31 and as such are
liable to lively debate. Nevertheless, they
are important and we overlook them at our own
peril.

Desensitization to animal sufferipg is in it
self a terrible thing. R.D.Laing has rightly
observed, "We become less human to the extent
that we treat any living beings as things."34
Another related concern has to do with the long
term effects of desensitization. the English
philosopher John Locke once argued that we
should discourage cruelty in children on the
grounds that lithe custom of tormenting and kill
ing beasts, will, by degrees, harden their minds
even towards men." 35 If Locke is correct there
is clearly a danger that desensitization con
cenring animal suffering will result in desensi
tization concerning human suffering. While I
suspect there is something to this correlation
1 am not prepared to affirm it. One reason is
that Locke overlooks the extent to which human
beings are capable of arbitrarily restricting
their sphere of concern: the fact, if it were
a fact, that I am not disturbed by black men
dying in the streets of South Africa does not
show that I am not seriously concerned with
the sufferings of friends and neighbors; a
society which routinely inflicts pain on ani
mals (or barbarians, for that matter) may
strenuously resist harming any person who is
Richard Ryder has argued in his book, Victims
a member of that society. However, while
of Science, that the most horrible feature of
this capacity to draw arbitrary distinctions
animal experimentation as presently practiced
protects the general practice of animal ex
is its "terrible ordinariness."32 What in the
perimentation from what we might call "Locke's
case of Jill and Philo is a tragedy, forced on
objection," it opens it up to another, more
the father by extraordinary circumstances, be
serious objection. C. S. Lewis put the prob
comes in science a way of life. In the process
lem this way:
animals utilized cease to be seen as creatures
Once the old Christian idea of a total
....ith
....
ith lives and purposes of their own and become
difference in kind between man and beast
instead "animal tools," instruments for the
has been abandoned, then no argument for
purpose of man. That such de-sensitization
experiments on animals can be found which
occurs is quite plausible on general psycho
is not also an argument for experiments
logical grounds. The routine infliction of
on inferior men. 36
misery exerts a strong pressure toward desen
sitization. Evidence that such desensitization Given the discovery that some animals not only
occurs can be found in the terminology used
construct tools but also have highly developed
when speaking of animals, the range of uses
systems of communication, Lewis' point is not
to which animals are put, the minimal condi
a trivial one. If Washoe and her relatives
tions under which animals are kept and the
have greater psychological capacities than
growth of an "animal industry" promoting the
severely retarded humans, why should we in
use of animals. 33 All of this, of course, is
flict terrible suffering on chimpanzees but
not to deny that individual scientists may be
not on less capable humans? According to the
very sensitive to the horrors of animal suf
c-system one is morally obligated to give
fering. Some scientists, of whom I have been
preference
to more highly developed creatures.
fortunate to meet mo~e than a few, care enough
My
point
is
not to advocate using retarded
that they refuse to participate in practices
persons
in
research.
It is simply that a so
common to others. The problem I want to note
ciety
which
inflicts
extreme
suffering on
here is not one of individual cruelty but
higher
animals
ought
to
have
good reasons
rather that posed by an institutionalized
for
not
inflicting
it
on
"lower
humans." If
thoughtlessness, a widespread and socially con
they
don't,
that
society
ceases
to be a ra
doned failure to realize just what it is that
tional
society
and
I,
for
one,
regard
that
is being done. The mere fact that so many de
as
most
undesirable.
If
Lewis'
point
is
to
fenders of animal experimentation regard cri
be
set
aside,
we
need
some
good,
morally
tics thereof as overly-emotional sentimentalists
relevant reasons for treating all animals
is itself an indication that desensitization
differently
than !ll humans. To my knowl
has occurred.

•
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edge, the defenders of animal experimenta
tion have yet to come up with any such
reasons.
Another concern has to do with the desir
ability of life in a society which routinely
sacrifices animal interests. By way of mak
ing this point, let me step back a moment
from questions of right and wrong and call
attention to just how sad it is that so many
animals live such horrible lives. In order
to do so let me make reference to an intrig
uing little story by Desmond Stewart. 37 I n
this story the earth is invaded and conquer
ed bv an alien race, the Troogs. The Troogs
proc~ed to treat humans no better .nor worse
than we have treated the animals. In this
they feel completely justified since they
are without doubt vastly superior to human
beings. Yet for all their unquestioned
superiority we cannot help but feel that
the Troogs are lacking something, some
basic trait which would raise them above
the brutal level at which they act. We
might even be tempted to call the trait
they lack 'humanity,' that is, humane
ness, the having of compassion, sympathy,
and consideration for other creatures.
Whether or not the Troogs are morally jus
tified in what they do, we fee! it is be
neath their dignity as superior creatures
to so callously and routinely use inferior
creatures for their own purposes. 38
Finally, we must reckon with the possi
bility that in pursuing benefits to be
gained from animal experimentation we are,
almost paradoxically, cutting ourselves
off from a deeper source of happiness. In
the final analysis, human happiness does
not stem from a longer life or even good
health but from the sense of a life well
lived. Even if the practice of animal ex
perimentation makes a significant contri
bution to longer life or better health-
something which I doubt--we still must ask
whether in so doing it contributes to human
happiness. My own conviction is that on the
whole it does not. An integral part of a
truly good life is a sense of having contri
buted to the well-being of others. In this
respect, the wise person Willingly sacrifices
elements of his/her well-being for the well
being of others. A life built around the
suffering of others can only be happy in the
most restricted of senses. Correspondingly,
a society which promotes the welfare of a
few at the cost of inflicting on all respon
sibility for the massive suffering of animals
is not a desirable society from the stand
point of human happiness. The person who

doubts this need only ask whether increased
health and life-span, whatever their source,
have resulted in increased happiness. So
far as I can see, they have not. 39
This completes my discussion of reasons for
believing that the general practice of animal
experimentation is not a worthy practice. To
gether they suggest that not only is that
practice not necessary for human health or
survival but further, that it has a baneful
effect on the overall well-being of society.
If successful, these reasons indicate that
present scientific practices involving animal
suffering cannot be justified even on the c
system. This conclusion, I note, is not a con
sequence of assigning greater weight to ani
mal interests but of asking seriously whether
the institution in question is in the best
interests of human society. One nice effect
of this approach is that the issue of animal
welfare becomes part and parcel of a larger
issue concerning the nature and goals of
social organization: what constitutes a truly
good life for humans and how should society
be structured so as to allow maximal realiza
tion of that life. 40 Reflection on the moral
status of animals will not resolve that issue.
Until it is dealt with, however, we cannot say
whether the general practice of animal experi
mentation is in the best interests of (normal)
human beings. 41

III
Historically, human uniqueness has been
taken to justify exploitation of animals. 42
We have just seen reason to question any such
attempt. Even if animal life and suffering
is inconsequential compared to ours, it does
not follow that animals exist only for us,
not for themselves. It may be that what makes
us unique--what raises us so far above the
level of brutes--is a capacity to appreciate
the value each sentient creature's life has
for it itself. Our examination of the c
system, a minimal morality according high
priority to human interests, suggests that
granting any value to animal well-being places
serious limitations on the human use of ani
Our own unique life as moral and rational
agents picks up this value, incorporates it
into our own quest for fulfillment and, there
by, multiplies its significance.
Advocates of animal welfare have no intrin
sic reason for fearing human uniqueness. As
long as uniqueness is l'inked to responsibility
as well as privilege it provides a buffer for
animal interests. We have seen this to be the
case with the c-system. Granting humans the
privilege of violating animal interests for
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the sake of their own interests provides no
license for excess once it is realized that
human interests are tied to animal welfare.
That human interests are so tied follows from
the vary uniqueness of humans. Given this,
though, we need not give up the quest for a
stronger system than the c-system. One weak
weak
ness in the above line of argument is that it
trades too heavily on human interests: it
sounds as though treating animals well is not
something that should be done for its own
sake·. This is a just criticism. Although the
c-system does accord moral standing to animals,
that standing is so low as to require multi~
plication by human interest to protact animal
~elfare~ Whatever the status of the c-system,
however, the accessibility of such reenforce
reenforce
ment is itself heartening.
Richard L. Fern
University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign
II use the term 'animal' as short for 'non
'non
human animal.' Earlier versions of this pa
pa
per ~ere given at the Conference on Medicine
.
'
An~mals and Man held at the University of

Illinois Medical Center (Chicago Circle),
Lake Forest College, the University of Ill
Ill
inois (Urbana) and Yale University. The paper
~hich now appears is both clearer and stronger
as a result of ensuing discussion. Special
thanks are due Charlotte Brown, David Keppler,
Paul Langner, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Sally Moran,
Mary Morgan, Mike Nelson, Don Scheid and Jim
Wallace.
Wallace.�
211 On e restr~ct~on
..
on t h�h e absolutism of man's
rule over Nature is now generally accepted;
moral philosophers and public opinion agree
that it is morally impermissible to be cruel
to animals. And by this they mean
mean...
... that it
is wrong to cause them to suffer unnecessar
unnecessar
ily." John Passmore, "The Treatment of Ani
Ani
mals," Journal of the Historv of Ideas, XXXVI
(1975), p.195. Moral philosophers, of course,
differ as to whether our moral responsibility
to animals is direct or indirect. For more on
this issue, see Tom Regan's introduction to
Animal Rights and Human Obligations, ed. by
Rom Regan and Peter Singer (Prentice-Hall,
1976) .

3"The humanity which would prevent human
suffering is a deeper and truer humanity than
the humanity which would save pain or death
in the animal." Charles Eliot. Quoted in
Robert J. White, "Antivivisection: The Reluc
Reluc
tant Hydra," The American Scholar, vol. 40
(1971); reprinted in Regan and Singer pp.
163-169.
'

4Donald VanDeVeer, "Interspecific Justice,"
Inouiry, vol.22 (1979), p. 58.
SLawrence Haworth argues not only that ani
ani
mals have rights but that these tights are
extremely weak and easily overridden by human
interests. Cf. "Rights, Wrongs and Animals,"
Ethics, vol. 88 (1978).
6For discussion of much of this research,
see Edmund Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Syn
Syn
thesis (Harvard, 1975). Wilson's book con
con
tains an extensive bibliography.
7For example, Donald Griffin, The Question
of Animal Awareness (Rockefeller University
Press, 1976).
8VanDeVeer.
9Robert Nozick makes a similar suggestion
in Anarchy, State and Uto~ia (Basic, 1974),
p. 40.
lOCf. VanDeVeer, pp. 74ff, for a discussion
of several objections to two-factor egalitar
egalitar
ianism.
11H. J. McCloskey has argued that only beings
who ought to be concerned about their interests
have interests. If this were so, it follows
that animals, of whom it cannot be said that
they ought to do anything, do not have inter
inter
ests. Tom Regan has replied, correctly II be
be
lieve, that while interests are the sorts of
things moral agents ought to be concerned about,
it is not true that only moral agents have
interests. Here, as elsewhere, Regan draws
parallels between the status of animals and
"marginal humans" such as infants and sever1y
retarded persons. Cf. McCloskey, "Rights,"
Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 15 (1965) and
Regan, Philosophical Quarterlv, vol 26 (1979),
pp. 251-7.
12Cf. Wilson. Also, George Schaller, ~
Mountain Gorilla (University of Chicago, 1963);
L. David Mech, The Wolf (Natural History Press,
1970), and Jane van Lawick-Goodall, In the
Shadow of Man (Houghton Mifflin, 1971).
13VanDeVeer also distinguishes between basic,
serious and peripheral interests; his distinc
distinc
tions are somewhat different from mine.
l4 It does not follow, of course, that all
all�
social animals have a marked capacity to learn�
learn
from experience.
experience.�
lSJames Rachels develops the notion of "hav
"hav
ing a life in a biographical sense" in a talk,
"Do Animals Have a Right to Life?" given at
the 1979 Blacksburg conference on Ethics and
Animals, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University.
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16Cf. Nozick, p. 42; also, VanDeVeer, p.70.
The justification of this principle lies at
the heart of tyo-factor egalitarianism.
17Given that various humans, present and fu
ture, have interests in keeping (some) animals
alive, the Bl-principle will not justify whole
sale slaughter of animals.
leA similar claim is made by Peter Singer,
Animal Liberation (Avon, 1975), p.6 and p.22;
also, VanDeVeer, pp. 70f.

19
has labeled "speciesism," is argued by him to
be a bare prejudice, a flat violation of the
basic moral principle that equal amounts of
suffering are equally bad regardless of who or
what is the subject of such suffering.
24 American Journal of Public Health, vol.57,
no. 9, September, 1967; p. 1626. Published as
one of 4 articles jointly titled "Vivisection-
Vivistudv: The Facts and the Benefits to Animal
and Huma~ Health." Reprints of these articles
are available from The National Society for
Medical Research.

19For examples of such suffering, see Singer;
25Thomas McKeown, The Role of Medicine: Dream,
also Richard Ryder, Victims of Science (London,
Mirage or Nemesis? Princeton University Press,
1975) and Jeff Diner, Phvsical and Mental Suf
fering of Experimental Animals (Animal Welfare 1979, p.79. McKeown is Emeritus Professor of
Social Medicine at the University of Birming
Institute, 1979).
ham.
20Excellent work has been done in this regard
2EoMcKeown, p .10.
by the Scientists' Center for Animal Welfare.
For some suggestions as to how suffering may be
270ne area in which animal research has bear
reduced see Russell and Burch's discussion of
ing on the prevention of disease is that of nu
the three "r's"--reduction, refinement and re
trition. I Since it might be felt that such re
placement--in W.M.S.Russell and R.L.Burch, The search vitiates the ne~ative implications of
Principles of Humane Experimental Technique
McKeown's work, I include the following comment:
(Methuen, 1959).
The first and most important reason for
2lAlbert Schweitzer, "The Ethic of Reverence
the decline of infectious diseases was
for Life," reprinted in Regan and Singer, p.137.
an improvement in nutrition. It resulted
from advances in agriculture which spread
22D. H. Smyth, Alternatives to Animal Experi
throughout the western world from about
mentation (Scholars Press in association with
the end of the seventeenth century. Al
the Research Defense Society, 1978), p. 167.
though incidental to our theme, it is of
23Recent1y, Tom Regan, James Rachels, Joel
great interest that the advance was due
Feinberg and others have followed Henry Salt
initially to the introduction of new
(Animal Rights, MacMillan, 1894) in arguing that
crops such as the potato and maize, and
if humans have rights, so do animals. Each ar
to more effective application of tradi
gues that if all humans have moral rights then,
tional methods--increased land use,
"iven the existence of so-called "marginal hu
manuring, winter feeding, rotation of
:ans" there are no good reasons for claiming
crops, etc.--rather than to mechanical
that only humans have moral rights. Presenta
or chemical methods associated with in
tions~these arguments can be found in the
dustrialization." (McKeown, p.7S)
Regan/Singer anthology. A recent attempt at
It is also worth noting in light of recent con
rebuttal can be found in R.G.Frey's book, In
troversies that extensive research has not led
terests and Ri~hts: the Case A~ainst Animals
to agreement regarding acceptable levels of
(Oxford, 1980). Other writers, for whom the
notion of moral rights has little appeal, have cholesteroL
argued in a similar manner from different bases.
28In pressing this question, it should not
In his book, The Moral Status of Animals (Ox
be forgotten that numerous persons have, as a
ford, 1977), Stephen Clark argues in a Humean
consequence of medical innovations, suffered
vein that the moral sentiment applies to both
more than they would have otherwise. This in
humans and animals. A much better known argu
cludes persons undergoing unnecessary and/or
ment is th~t of Peter Singer. Singer has argu unsuccessful operations as well as term1nally
ed along classical utilitarian lines that the
ill patients who are forced often against
only reason we feel justified in giving free
their will to continue a life full of pain.
rein to the practice of animal experimentation A useful discussion of some of these problems
is that we arbitrarily choose to regard animal
relative to coronary bypass surgery can be
suffering as less important than human suffer
found in The New York Times, November 18, 1980,
ing. This view, which Singer (following Ryder) p. l5f. Not only does this article suggest
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that bypass surgery is a "mixed blessing," it
36C.S.Lewis, God in the Dock: Essays on Theol
also indicates that reduction of risk factors
ogy and Ethics, ed. by Walter Hooper. W. B.
such as cigarette smoking, hypertension, hyper Eerdmans, 1970, p. 227.
cholesteremia, obesity and sedentary living
makes a far greater contribution to the elimin
37Desmond Stewart. "The Limits of Trooghaft."
ation of atherosclerosis.
Encounter (London, February, 1972). Reprinted
in Regan and Singer, pp. 238-45.
29McKeown. p. 9.
38T.L.S.Sprigge has raised a question as to
30According to the National Institute of
whether truly enlightened people would even want
Heal th Publication No. 80-2091, approximately
to survive "at the cost of massive suffering to
$800 million was spent on research using lab
other sentient creatures." Sprigge. p. 130.
oratory animals by nonprofit organizations in
After reflecting on this question, proceed to
1978 alone. Of this amount, a larger percentage reflect on how little our own well-being, let
~as paid for through grants and contracts from
alone survival, depends on the massive suffer
NIH. The amount spent is not going down. A re ing we inflict on animals.
cent article in The New York Times of December
7, 1980, estimates that i t will cost as much
39"'What is man 'Without the beasts? If all
as 3 billion dollars just to test presently ex the beasts were gone, man would die from great
isting chemicals as required by the Toxic Sub loneliness of spirit, for whatever happens to
the beasts also happens to man. All things are
stances Control Act of 1976. While such. work
connected." Remark attributed to the Suquamish
may be methodologically sound, one wonders
Indian Chief Seatlh 1855. Cited in National
whether the economy would be better off if less Geoiraohic, vol. 159. no. 2, p. 159.
expensive
.
. alternatives were pursued. In a recent
~O
letter to The Beast, Andrew Rowan of the Insti
Numerous persons, including Lawrence Haworth
(Haworth. p.109), Philip Devine ("The Moral
tute for the Study of Animal Problems and a
noted authority on the topic of "alternatives," Basis of Vegetarianism," Philosophy, vol. 53
claims, "perhaps 50% of all animals used in
(1978), p.493), and Maurice Visscher (Journal of
sa fety evaluation and toxicity testing could be the American Medican Association, vol. 199 , no.
stopped immediately without jeopardizing human
9 (1967), p.129) have suggested that concern
health or safety." (The Beast, no. 8, Winter
for animal welfare takes the place of concern
1980-81; p. 56.)
for human welfare. While this may be true for
•
some, there is no necessary trade-off. Indeed,
J1r use 'gOOd' here in a non-moral sense.
the two concerns have often come
COme together.
32Ryder, Victims of Science, p. 18.
According to Passmore, "The attack on slavery,
33
..
.
a t the hands of evangelicals and of Bentham,
A recent art~cle . ~n The" New York Times (De ran hand - in- han d Wl'th t h e attac k on crue 1 ty to
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"Ur:ilities, Godlovitch and Harris, p. 173. An significant improvements in animal welfare will
insightful albeit controversial analysis of
only come about through the development of more
?roblems associated with desensitization can be equitable social systems. Animals occupy a spe
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ism and Animal Rights," Inquirv, vol. 22, nos.
are politically helpless. When animals are
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~:>Quoted in Robert S. Brumbaugh, "Of Man,
Animals, and Morals: A Brief History," On the
~lIt appears then, that in the final analysis
Fifth Dav: Animal Rights and Human Ethics, ed.
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4Z"Brutes are as things in our regard: so far
as they are useful to us, they exist for us,
not for themselves; and we do right in using
them unsparingly for our need and convenience,
thought not for our wantonness." Father Joseph
Rickaby, Moral Philosoohy
Phi10soohy (1901); extract re
reprinted in Regan and Singer, p. 180.

